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Abstract: This paper demonstrates that the logic of debt is founded on an 
infinite task, amounting to a process of continual repayment with never an end in 
sight. This infinite task expresses as its inner contradiction: “borrow, spend, and 
be guilty.” Through the formula “I promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum 
of…”, inscribed on every banknote in the UK, I show how the juridico-political 
apparatuses function to maintain the force of the utterance. Through Agamben’s 
archeology of the oath, I show how the ‘I promise’ functions as a performative 
speech act, that ultimately acts as a commandment, or an order-word. Therefore, 
the notion of debt can only be conceptualised as that which is constituted by 
the force of language, which is simultaneously reliant on a secondary threat 
of physical force in order to maintain the primary force of the utterance. The 
incorporeal transformation that results from this renders each of us perpetually 
indebted persons.
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Nothing is more dismal, therefore, than this unconditional being-in-
force of juridical categories in a world in which they no longer mirror 
any comprehensible ethical content: their being-in-force is truly 
meaningless, much as the countenance of the guardian of the law in 
Kafka’s parable in inscrutable. […] The law here retreats back to its 
original injunction that - according to the intention of the Apostle 
Paul - expresses its inner contradiction: be guilty.1 
  
When we are initially confronted with the notion of debt, we are perhaps 
struck by how little we know on the subject. In a material sense, one certainly 
knows what it means to be thousands of pounds in debt. The socio-economic 
ramifications of the realities of debt, is something that we are all undoubtedly 
familiar with, though to varying degrees. Our first impression of contemporary 
material debt is that it is more individualised than ever before. Certainly, 
particular nations in Africa, the Indian sub-continent, and Latin America will 
have experienced this form of individualised debt for quite some time; through 
instruments of international economic development, ‘micro-finance’ for example. 
Indeed, in Uttar Pradesh, India, an eighteen-year-old girl drank a lethal dose of 
pesticide after giving her remaining 150 rupees (equivalent to $3) to a micro-
finance organisation to whom she was indebted. This money she had saved and 
earmarked for paying her examination entrance fees.2 
 In Western Europe at least, individualised debt is a relatively novel 
experience, which has accelerated in light of the decline of what used to be 
known as the welfare state. In the UK for instance, the attempt to reduce national 
state debt through a reduction in government spending, has individualised what 
was a collective debt, the consequence is that ‘a nurse from Buckinghamshire,’ 
for example, cannot earn a wage sufficient enough to ‘live within her means.’ 
Instead it has become necessary for key workers like her to become indebted 
through a reliance on payday loans.3 The combination of loans and the increased 
use of food banks are the only way to make ends meet, for key workers in 
the era of individualised debt. Extrapolate this experience to student finance 
and higher education and we begin to see how the collective ‘burden’ of an 
educated society has now become individualised, such that each student has 
become responsible for their educational indebtedness. Of course, each student, 
nurse, failed consumer and unborn child is equally responsible for government 
debt; a debt that governments are responsible for and which has accumulated 
over the years and decades. We can now keep track of the debt that we owe 
thanks to the website ‘National Debt Clocks.’4 This website claims to accurately 
present us with an updated sum of world debt, which continually changes with 
every passing second, including the amount of interest accrued which also 
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increases in real time. Since the time of writing, the interest accrued for the 
two minutes I spent on the website stands at roughly about $10,000,000, an 
exact sum is impossible to note down since the figure changes in a flash. What 
is this expectation and responsibility that we shoulder? An ever increasing sum 
of money driving many around the world to take their own lives, and forcing 
nation states to the brink of bankruptcy (though, always ever on the brink)? It 
seems that what we are presented with, the curious possibility of acquiring a 
form of pleasure through consumer spending fueled by ‘debt,’ leads to a kind 
of happiness that amounts to little more than an ‘infinite task.’ A continual 
process of repayment, with no end in sight. Expressing its inner contradictions as 
“borrow, spend, and be guilty.” 
 This paper is a cautious intervention, and in no way exhaustive. It seeks to 
understand how the idea of debt functions, and how we are to conceptualise it 
today. I show how debt is nothing more than its own revelation in language; the 
fact of its own fiction, of its own lack of signification, these are not obstacles to 
our own acting otherwise. That is to say, the fact that none of us know to what 
extent we are collectively indebted, nor, when we are likely to repay our debts, 
and how much we pay each year in interest, is irrelevant - we do not need to 
know these things. Whether or not we will ever have a balanced budget is of no 
real significance. The point is that the juridico-political apparatuses enforce the 
law to ensure the efficacy of the utterance, so that the real force of language, 
and the efficacious formula is maintained each time. In the end, I show how debt 
can be conceptualised as that which is constituted by the force of language, that 
is, at the same time, reliant on a second physical force in order to maintain the 
first force of the word.
(Re)Paying the (Un)Payable
I promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of…
This quote is inscribed on every banknote in the UK. This means that, with every 
financial transaction, a promise is being made. The promise to pay the bearer 
on demand the sum of £5, or £10, or £20 etc. At first sight, this formula appears 
as a quirky historical relic, perhaps of ancient significance, but, one assumes 
that it certainly bears no relation to our present, modern, times. What this 
formula captures is precisely the core of our prevailing politics, economics and 
philosophy. In Debt: The First 5000 Years, anthropologist David Graeber explains 
that money and debt emerged simultaneously; and that it is debt, in fact, which 
makes money possible.5 Graeber’s analysis on the intricate relation between 
money and debt is an interesting and a useful way of conceptualising what the 
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‘promise’ of our banknote formula could signify. The idea that money has some 
equivalence with debt6 is most clearly articulated according to what is known as 
the “Credit Theory of Money.” Here, money is not considered to be a commodity, 
or a pure ‘thing’ as such, but rather an abstract system of measurement.7 
Graeber asks: “If money is just a yardstick, what then does it measure? The 
answer was simple: debt. A coin is, effectively, an IOU.”8 In other words, money 
appears simply as a promise, to pay something of equivalent value, so that “the 
value of a unit of currency is not the measure of the value of an object, but the 
measure of one’s trust in other human beings.”9 Interestingly, an IOU can really 
only function as money as long as the original debt is never actually repaid. This 
same logic marked the founding of the Bank of England, when, in 1694 King 
William III looked to raise money for the war against France. Graeber explains:
 
In 1694, a consortium of English bankers made a loan of £1,200,000 
to the king. In return they received a royal monopoly on the issuance 
of banknotes. What this meant in practice was they had the right to 
advance IOUs for a portion of the money the king now owed them to 
any inhabitant of the kingdom willing to borrow from them, or willing 
to deposit their own money in the bank in effect, to circulate or 
‘monetize’ the newly created royal debt. This was a great deal for the 
bankers […], but it only worked as long as the original loan remained 
outstanding. To this day, this loan has never been paid back. It 
cannot be. If it ever were, the entire monetary system of Great Britain 
would cease to exist.10
The seemingly paradoxical relationship between money and debt is not limited 
to the UK and the origins of the Bank of England. In the US for example, Graeber 
argues that the debts in question are so large that they will never actually be 
repaid: “its national debt has become a promise, not just to its own people, 
but to the nations of the entire world, that everyone knows will not be kept.”11 
Elsewhere, Graeber identifies one of the first examples of the use of financial 
instruments, and the issuing of municipal bonds. The practice, we are told, 
began with the twelfth century Venetian government, who, again, in need of a 
military budget, “levied a compulsory loan on its taxpaying citizens, for which 
it promised each of them five percent annual interest, and allowed the ‘bond’ 
or contracts to become negotiable, thus, creating a market in government 
debt.”12 There exists an inextricable relation between state expansion and the 
creation of an indebted population - and each time, a promise of repayment 
is made. Money, for its part, relies on the creation of debts for an apparatus of 
financial circulation to take place. Whether or not the initial loan is ever repaid 
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seems inconsequential, though our financial paradigm would certainly err on 
the side of infinite repayment. What matters instead seems to be the promise 
of repayment that accompanies the very notion of a debt. In accepting a debt, 
one is essentially giving one’s word to repay the debt that one owes. What this 
promise signifies is the correspondence between words and actions, effectively 
mimicking the institution of the oath. If with every financial transaction, a 
promise is being made, it seems that an analysis on how a non-correspondence 
between words and actions functions in our context of debt could prove to be a 
useful endeavour. If our words are spoken in vain, then it is quite possible that we 
are living with a continual curse of perjury - though evidently, judging from our 
delirious insistence on repaying the un-repayable, the news of the curse is yet to 
arrive. What follows is a brief analysis on the oath and its function as a guarantor 
of language, comprised of a structure mimicking a performative speech act.
The Promise of Infinite Debt
In The Sacrament of Language, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben 
undertakes a philosophical archeology of the oath. Agamben begins his analysis 
by questioning whether the institution of the oath is a function of pre-law; that 
is, belonging to the magico-religious sphere. In fact, the oath is not something 
that precedes law and religion, rather it is both religion and law that emerge 
from the oath, and, more precisely, Agamben argues that the oath precedes an 
originary division between magic, religion and law. For Agamben:
 
The entire problem of the distinction between the juridical and the 
religious, in particular as regards the oath, is thus poorly put. Not 
only do we have no reason for postulating a pre juridical phase 
in which the oath belonged solely to the religious sphere, but 
perhaps our entire habitual way of representing to ourselves the 
chronological and conceptual relationship between law and religion 
must be revised. Perhaps the oath presents to us a phenomenon that 
is not, in itself, either (solely) juridical or (solely) religious but that 
precisely for this reason, can permit us to rethink from the beginning 
what law is and what religion is.13
The oath is akin to a verbal act, one that is intended to guarantee the 
effectiveness of a promise, carrying with it both juridical and religious elements. 
For example, in Legum alegoriae, Philo discusses the oath that God makes to 
Abraham, in relation to his son Isaac: “the very words of God are oaths […] and 
laws of God and most sacred ordinances; and a proof of His sure strength is that 
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whatever He says comes to pass.”14 What is striking from Philo’s text, is the clear 
relation Philo builds between the oath and religion, as well as law and language. 
A similar point is articulated elsewhere, in De Sacrificiis, Philo states that “God 
spoke and it was done, with no interval between the two […], the oath of men is 
thus the attempt to conform human language to this divine model, making it, as 
much as possible, pistos, credible.”15 Once more, it appears that Philo establishes 
a relation between God and the oath, suggesting that the words of God are 
oaths in and of themselves. This shows that both human language and religion 
are drawn to the oath, such that: “on the one hand, in the oath human language 
communicates with that of God; on the other hand, if God is the being whose 
words are oaths, it is completely impossible to decide if he is reliable because 
of the oath or if the oath is reliable because of God.”16 Agamben shows that 
the oath is concerned with the very credibility of language, suggesting that the 
oath could very well precede both religion and law. In this way, the oath is an 
institution analogous to what Agamben calls a ‘Sacrament of Language,’ and 
is therefore concerned with the very fact that the human being speaks. In this 
sense, the oath appears to be a part of a more curious phenomenon, acting as a 
mechanism to assure the human being of his word.
 As a ‘Sacrament of Language’ the oath is characterised by the importance 
of trust (fides), and faithfulness, that is, conceptualised as the correspondence 
between language and actions. It is for this reason that the function of the 
oath in relation to the speaking subject is of interest to us, in the sense that the 
ancient maxim of the separation between words and actions appears to find 
its resolution in this apparatus. The oath is a useful tool in this regard, since it is 
not concerned with the semiotic content of a particular statement, but rather 
functions as a mode of assurance: to guarantee the effectiveness of language, a 
mechanism of ensuring that words and actions coincide. As Agamben explains:
The oath, defined by the correspondence between words and 
actions here performs an absolutely central function. This happens 
not only on the theological level, in that it defines God and his logos, 
but also on the anthropological level, since it relates human language 
to the paradigm of divine language. If the oath is, in fact, that 
language that is always realised in facts and this is the logos of God 
[…], the oath of men is thus the attempt to conform human language 
to this divine model, making it, as much as possible, pistos, credible.17
Therefore, the oath is an apparatus that functions as a guarantor of statements, 
that, in other words, seeks to guarantee truthfulness. It appears that the oath’s 
obligatory nature does not derive from the Gods as such, but rather “from 
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the fact that it is situated in the sphere of a more far-reaching institution, the 
fides, which regulates relations among men as much as those between people 
and cities. […] Faithfulness is thus essentially the correspondence between 
language and actions.”18 In this way, the institution of the fides performed an 
important function in regulating relations between people and cities, and thus 
held a prominent position in the sphere of public law. For the Romans, an 
essential character for men in public life was the fides, that is, equivalent to 
the idea of good faith, where this would express reliability and a reciprocity of 
trust. The fides is usually accompanied by an oath, where one offers oneself 
to another, without reservation, in exchange for protection: “the object of the 
fides is, in every case, as in the oath, conformity between the parties’ words 
and actions.”19 By illustrating the notion of the fides, Agamben highlights the 
fact that the boundaries and relationships between religion and law are not 
clearly distinguished, arguing instead that the complexity of these intertwined 
institutions necessitates that we reconsider our definitions of what constitutes 
the juridical and the religious. The juridical aspect usually attributed to the 
oath is articulated in terms of a kind of legal sanction, that is to say, when one 
does not keep one’s word, or when one’s actions fail to match one’s word. For 
Agamben, the notion of perjury - the punishment that is left to the Gods - is 
not evidence of the existence of ‘pre-law’, since this conceptualisation ignores 
the juridico-political context that the notion of perjury is itself is associated 
with.20 Indeed, all oaths include some notion of perjury, traditionally conceived 
as a curse. Importantly, the oath does not constitute a remedy for detecting 
falsehood or preventing untruths, instead, the very possibility of the latter is 
immediately contained in the oath - immanent to it - in the form of perjury.21
 In this way, the oath functions as a decisive operator, as a means of 
assuring the human being of his word, that is, to affirm the truthfulness of 
speech. Whether a statement is true or not, is of little concern, what matters 
instead is the signifying power of language as such. What Agamben seeks 
to illustrate is that, from the beginning, the speaking being is confronted by 
a certain kind of incredulity with respect to language. That the fact that one 
speaks appears to be troubling in and of itself. Agamben dedicates a vast and 
intricate analysis of this theme in his work, the subject of which is key to his 
entire philosophical project. In this context, it suffices to note that the human 
being enters into language in a manner that differs greatly from other animals; 
who are always-already in language, open to the world. For the human being, 
on the contrary, speech is mediated by discourse. Through an analysis of 
Benveniste’s work, Agamben shows that the human being does not have a fixed 
code of signals whose content is clearly defined (like the language of bees, for 
instance).22 This, in turn, suggests that there exists an infinite potentiality of 
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communication. The peculiarity of human language lies in the fact that, unlike 
other living beings “man is not limited to acquiring language as one capacity 
among others that he is given but has made of it his specific potentiality; he has, 
that is to say, put his very nature at stake in language.”23 
 This means that the ‘limit of language’ is not a question of cognition, 
that is, of the inadequate relation, or, insufficiency of equivalence, between 
the signifier and the signified. Instead, the ‘limit’ in question is immanent to 
language, and more precisely, this concerns the truthfulness of one’s word, 
“of what can guarantee the original connection between names and things, 
and between the subject who has become a speaker - and, thus capable of 
asserting and promising - and his actions.”24 To situate language purely on a 
plane of accumulated knowledge or greater cognition, would be to ignore the 
fundamental relation between language and ethics. Since, the human must 
appropriate language and must make it her own, the subjective aspect of 
this  event necessarily implies that a form of ethics coincides with language. 
The human being is continually confronted with the possibility of both truth 
and lie in language, that is, the possibility of the non-coincidence between 
words and actions, as such, the apparatus of the oath functions, not to verify 
fact from fiction, but, rather, to make language credible. For Agamben “every 
naming, every act of speech is, in this sense, an oath, in which the logos (the 
speaker in the logos) pledges to fulfil his word, swears on its truthfulness, on 
the correspondence between words and things that is realised in it.”25 Since the 
speaking subject is faced with the possibility of both truths and lies, the oath 
functions as the decisive operator that guarantees the accuracy and force of 
the word, by putting its life at stake in language, thus binding words, things, 
and actions. But what happens when such promises cannot be kept? When the 
correspondence between words and actions, is radically called into question? 
For Agamben:
When the ethical - and not simply cognitive - connection that unites 
words, things, and human action is broken, this in fact promotes a 
spectacular and unprecedented proliferation of vain words on the 
one hand and, on the other, of legislative apparatuses that seek 
obstinately to legislate on every aspect of that life on which they 
seem no longer to have any hold.26 
One could argue, in this sense, that our pronouncement, each time, of the 
promise to pay our debts, is a pure performance. Given that we know full 
well that such a promise, cannot be kept - they are words spoken in vain. The 
legislative apparatuses, however, continue to ensure that one repays one’s debts, 
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whatever this might signify, whatever the cost may be, and, the ‘sum of…’ to be 
repaid in this lifetime, or the next.
 The promise contained in the formula: “I promise to pay the bearer 
on demand the sum of…” from our British banknotes, amounts to a pure 
performative utterance. In How to do Things with Words, the British philosopher 
of language J. L. Austin argued that not all statements are of a denotive 
character that merely express this or that fact, instead, some statements express 
commands.27 What Austin had in mind are performative utterances, these do 
not necessarily describe or report a particular fact, and are neither true or 
false. Austin suggests that “the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the 
doing of an action, which again would not normally be described as saying 
something.”28 Thus, the performative is an utterance that produces in itself, in 
its utterance, a fact. That is to say, that the performative syntagma’s meaning 
coincides with the reality that it produces, and, in doing so, seemly bridges the 
separation between words and actions.29 How is this possible? Looking at the 
syntagma that interests us, ‘I promise,’ we can observe that it can only express 
its value if it is accompanied by a dictum that contextualises it. The performative, 
in other words, is little more than a form of linguistic enunciation, that, rather 
than describing a thing, instead produces a reality through its own utterance.30 
Agamben argues that in doing so, the performative verb acquires a meaning of 
its own, thus suspending the denotive function of the dictum that accompanies 
it. In other words, taken on its own, the dictum that accompanies ‘I promise,’ 
the ‘to pay the bearer on demand the sum of…’ takes on a denotive character, 
almost like a pure observational statement and thus, lacks the efficiency it enjoys 
with the speech act. Agamben explains that “in the performative, language 
suspends its denotation precisely and solely to found its existential connection 
with things.”31 In fact, for Agamben, the performative utterance is not a sign, 
but a signature; insofar as it does not denote a thing, but confers the thing 
itself - animates it, and makes it effective. The function of the signature in this 
context, is to suspend the normal denotive character of language, whereby we 
encounter instead, a particular force of language. It is at this particular juncture, 
that we can perhaps begin to observe a structural similarity between the oath 
as a performative speech act, and the notion of the commandment - both of 
which expose the secret solidarity between the force of the law and the force 
of language; both posited as a lack devoid of content, acting instead for pure 
revelation.
Discourse on the Imperative: Debt and Commandment
Language is not life; it gives life orders. Life does not speak; it listens 
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and waits. Every order-word, even a father’s to his son, carries a little 
death sentence - a Judgement, as Kafka put it.32
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari show that an incorporeal 
transformation of the body can occur through an utterance; that is to say, 
through a ‘password’ or, a ‘mot d’ordre.’ The primary unit of language, the 
statement, the authors argue, is the order word.33 Language, in this sense, 
functions to be obeyed and to compel obedience. For Deleuze and Guattari: 
“words are not tools, but we give children language, pens and notebooks as 
we give workers shovels and pickaxes.”34 That is to say that the statement, or 
order-word in question does not refer to one form of signification or another, but 
rather is reliant on the fact that the information given is only the bare minimum 
that is necessary “for the emission, transmission, and observation of order words 
as commands.”35 Enough information to distinguish “power” from “powder,” for 
instance. The authors suggest that language functions through the transmission 
of hearsay, that is to say, that language transmits what one has heard, or what 
one has said to another - but not, what one has seen. This is interesting in the 
context of our understanding of debt; it matters little whether any nation state 
has indeed balanced their budget since the 2008 financial crisis, what matters is 
that somebody has said that this is our aim, or that is what we have heard from 
some economist, or another. This is because: 
Language is not content to go from a first party to a second party, 
from one who has seen to one who has not, but necessarily goes 
from a second party to a third party, neither of whom has seen. It is 
in this sense that language is the transmission of the word as order-
word, not the communication of a sign as information.36 
It seems that there is a close relationship between order-words and speech acts, 
since, in the former, the ‘other side’ to language - its ‘informational’ possibility 
- exists, that is, the subjectifying power of language: that which is brought to 
being in saying.37 In this sense, order-words are not limited to commands, but 
extend to “every act that is linked to statements by a social obligation.”38 These 
include questions and promises. It is in this way that language can be defined as 
the set of all order-words or speech acts, that language is not communicational, 
or informational, but is concerned with the transmission of order-words 
(either within a statement, or from one to another), “insofar as each statement 
accomplishes an act and the act is accomplished in the statement.”39 The authors 
argue that these ‘acts,’ necessarily involve an incorporeal transformation of the 
bodies of that society. That is to say that the incorporeal transformation occurs 
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through the performative, the speech act, the order-word - this is the force 
of language. In the context of a commandment, for instance, this necessitates 
an incorporeal transformation of the body of the person who receives it. To 
illustrate the idea of an incorporeal transformation, the authors point to a 
number of examples, among them, is the juridical example of a trial. The judge’s 
sentence transforms the accused into a convict: 
the transformation of the accused into a convict is a pure 
instantaneous act or incorporeal attribute that is the expressed 
of the judge’s sentence. […] The incorporeal transformation is 
recognisable by its instantaneousness, its immediacy, by the 
simultaneity of the statement expressing the transformation and the 
effect the transmission produces.40 
This notion of an incorporeal transformation can also be seen in Agamben’s 
exposition of the Homo Sacer, that sacred figure of Roman law. Indeed, 
Agamben traces this figure to Pompeius Festus’ treatise On the Significance 
of Words, in the treatise, Festus describes the sacred man as “the one whom 
the people have judged on account of a crime,” Festus adds that “it is not 
permitted to sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for 
homicide.”41 In other words, following the judgement of the accused person, 
the person becomes sacred (sacer esto), and is transformed into a Homo Sacer. 
This represents an incorporeal transformation of the body, from the moment of 
the utterance, thus illustrating the importance of the force of language that a 
commandment, an order-word, and performative speech-act can effectuate.
 For Agamben, the commandment entails a having-to-be, that is, in a 
certain sense, a presupposition of duty. This is because, in having-to-be, the 
connection between the subject and his action is disconnected, and instead 
reconstituted in a different way - where the act in question becomes an ‘efficacy’ 
in and of itself, that in turn determines the subject as such.42 In other words, a  
having-to-be, where being and action coincide: 
It is significant, then, that the imperative defines the verbal mode 
proper to law and religion. Not only are the laws of the Twelve Tables 
[…] and the formulas of juridical transactions […] in the imperative, 
but the oath, perhaps the oldest of the juridical-religious institutions, 
also implies a verb in the imperative. […] One understands, from 
this perspective, why juridical-religious formulas (of which the 
oath, the command, and the prayer are eminent examples) have a 
performative character: if the performative, by the simple fact of 
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being uttered, actualises its own meaning, this is because it does not 
refer to being but to having-to-be. It presupposes an ontology of 
estō and not of esti.43
Agamben shows that the ontology of the commandment (estō), takes 
precedence today.44 The having-to-be of the formula of the performative implies 
an incorporeal transformation of the body in one form or another. Indeed, as we 
know, the oath contains an utterance such as ‘I swear’, that is, a performative act. 
Similarly, the notion ‘I promise’ is itself a speech act, and must be accompanied 
by a dictum. Agamben explains that the ‘I promise’ is part of the non-apophantic 
logos, whilst the dictum that accompanies it is the apophantic logos, essentially 
composing indicative statements as opposed to the former, comprising instead 
of the imperative.45
There are, that is to say, two distinct and connected ontologies in 
the tradition of the West: the first, the ontology of the command, 
proper to the juridical-religious sphere, which is expressed in the 
imperative and has a performative character; the second, proper to 
the philosophical-scientific tradition, which is expressed in the form 
of the indicative.46 
The performative in language represents the survival of an era, where the 
relation between words and things was not apophantic, and instead took 
the form of a commandment.47 In this sense, the performative ‘I promise’ 
suspends the dictum ‘to repay the bearer on demand the sum of’, replacing 
the normal denotive character of language with the purely performative act, 
the commandment. The incremental replacement of the ontology of assertion 
(esti) with the ontology of commandment (estō) is a subtle change, and not 
necessarily represented by the explicit takeover of the imperative. As Agamben 
shows, the ontology of commandment today takes the form of advice, an 
invitation, and warnings offered in the name of security, “such that obedience 
of an order takes the form of a cooperation and, more often, a commandment 
given to oneself.”48 The force of language is maintained each time, through 
physical force when necessary.
 What is at work in the commandment and the performative speech act is 
a peculiar force of language, as we have already encountered. In The Signature 
of All Things, Agamben explains that the terms Indicum (clue) and index derive 
from the Latin dico, meaning, “to show” through the word, and hence “to say.” 
According to Agamben, linguists and philologists have noted the close proximity 
between the lexical family of the verb dico to the sphere of the the law.49 
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Agamben: “ ‘to show by words’ is the proper operation of the juridical formula, 
the uttering of which realises the condition necessary to produce a certain 
effect.”50 In a curious exposition of the term vindex, defined as that person 
who takes the place of the accused in a trial and therefore ready to suffer the 
consequences, Agamben shows how Pierre Noailles identified the derivation of 
the term as etymologically originating from vim dicere, that is, “to say or to show 
force.”51 On inquiring what kind of force this might imply, Agamben suggests that 
this is not a form of physical violence that is in question, but rather concerns the 
force of language. Agamben states that:
If we further develop Noailles’s thesis, it is possible to offer the 
hypothesis that the “force said by means of the word” in question 
in the action of the vindex is the force of the efficacious formula, 
as the originary force of the law. That is to say, the sphere of the 
law is that of an efficacious word, a “saying” that is always indicere 
(proclamation, solemn declaration), ius dicere (saying what is in 
conformity with the law), and vim dicere (saying the efficacious 
word). If this is true, then law is the sphere of signatures par 
excellence, where the efficacy of the word is in excess of its meaning 
(or realises it).52 
The space of the trial therefore demonstrates the coincidence of the force in 
place in the juridical system, which, for Agamben, has as its aim the maintenance 
of the force of language. The example of the action of the vindex,  demonstrates 
“the force of the efficacious formula as the originary force of the law.” In this 
sense, our formula “I Promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of…” is 
precisely the efficacious formula the force of the law seeks to maintain. That we 
are collectively incapable of ever repaying whatever the total sum each of us 
owe is insignificant, our governmental apparatuses will apply the force of the law 
each time.
I Promise to, be Guilty 
In Violence, Slavoj Žižek shows how the concept of objective violence functions 
in today’s capitalism, relating it to the encounter of the Lacanian distinction 
between the Real and reality.53 The point that Žižek develops, is that the 
abstraction of the self-enhancing circulation of capital is ‘real’ in the sense 
that it determines the social field in which we live. In other words, the fate of 
millions across the world is wholly determined and intricately related to the 
“speculative dance of capital.”54 Yet, one cannot understand the social reality of 
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material production without first understanding the abstraction that produces 
it. For Žižek, the difficulty that arises is that this kind of objective violence is 
not attributable to a particular target, or particular individual - it is anonymous 
and systemic. This gap between the Real and reality can be seen in countries 
the world over: “We see a lot of ecological decay and human misery. However, 
the economists’ report that one reads afterwards informs us that the country’s 
economic situation is ‘financially sound’ - reality doesn’t matter […].”55 It seems 
that our social and economic co-ordinates are determined by an abstraction, 
understanding it, attempting to grasp how such a thing could function is 
precisely the same gesture we have argued here.
 Our contemporary era is marked by commandments that take a 
variety of forms, from advertisement slogans to legal obligations. Clearly, our 
commandment to obey and promise to pay our nation’s debt is an event that 
is unlikely to happen. This is well known, and yet, is a curiously irrelevant point. 
In fact, it is presented by various media apparatuses as a distinct possibility, 
simply by suffering a bit more, individualising the debt a bit further. The reality 
is it matters very little whether we cannot repay our debts in full, nor will we be 
ever able to. Instead, we are confronted with the efficacious formula, the force 
of the word, and the transformation that occurs through its utterance. With 
every experience of exchange, the utterance “I promise to pay the bearer on 
demand the sum of…” necessitates an incorporeal transformation of each of us 
into an indebted person. Though the dictum ‘to pay the sum of…’ was suspended 
long ago, and is in continual suspension with every financial transaction; we 
are nevertheless indebted, ordered, commanded, to repay the entire sum. With 
the suspension of the apophantic dictum, what we are left with is the oath, the 
promise, the commandment - the non-apophantic formula, and the ontology 
of the estō. The politico-juridical apparatuses apply force, physical force if 
necessary, to ensure the validity and credibility of the word - such that the force 
of language, continues to live on. It seems, therefore, that debt is conceptualised 
as that which is constituted by the force of language, that is, at the same time, 
reliant on a second physical force in order to maintain the first force of the 
word. The world over debt hangs over us as an eternal promise of repayment. 
The vast majority of the total sum owed will never be repaid. Yet, we obey the 
commandment, continually determined to repay the un-repayable.
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